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Abstract: From a methodological point of view, this paper makes two contributions to 
the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a new measure of pro-poor growth. 
This new measure provides the linkage between growth rates in mean income and in 
income inequality. In this context, growth is defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is 
a gain (or loss) in the growth rate due to a decrease (or increase) in inequality. The other 
contribution is a decomposition methodology that explores linkages growth patterns, and 
labour market performances. Through the decomposition analysis, growth in per capita 
income is explained in terms of four labour market components: the employment rate, 
hours  of  work,  the  labour  force  participation  rate,  and  productivity.  The  proposed 
methodology  are  then  applied  to  the  Brazilian  National  Household  Survey  (PNAD) 
covering  the  period  1995-2004.  The  paper  analyzes  the  evolution  of  Brazilian  social 
indicators  based  on  per  capita  income  exploring  links  with  adverse  labour  market 
performance.    
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Resumo:  Uma  contribuição  deste  artigo  é  a  proposta  de  uma  nova  medida  do 
crescimento pró-pobre, no sentido de aumentar a ponderação daqueles com menor renda. 
Esta nova medida permite uma ligação direta entre as taxas de crescimento na renda 
média  e  na  desigualdade  de  renda  em  termos  de  mudancas  de  bem  estar.  A  outra 
contribuição  é  uma  metodologia  de  decomposição  da  contribuição  de  diferentes 
elementos do mercado de trabalho. Através desta decomposição, o crescimento da renda 
per capita é segmentado em quatro componentes: taxa de ocupação, taxa de participação, 
horas  de  trabalho  e  produtividade.    Também  avaliamos  a  contribuição  de  diferentes 
fontes  de  renda  não-trabalho  no  padrão  de  crescimento  assumido.  As  metodologias 
utilizadas  são  aplicadas  a  Pesquisa  Nacional  por  Amostra  de  Domicílios  (PNAD) 
analisando a evolução dos indicadores sociais brasileiros baseados na renda per capita de 
1995 até 2004, explorando ligações com diferentes aspectos do fraco desempenho do 
mercado de trabalho observadas. 
Palavras-Chaves: Desigualdade, Pobreza, Crescimento Pró-Pobre; Mercado de 
Trabalho 
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I.  Introduction 
 
This paper makes two contributions to the literature. One contribution is the proposal of a 
new measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage between 
growth rates in mean income and in income inequality. In this context, growth is defined 
as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in the growth rate due to a decrease 
(or increase) in inequality. The other contribution is a decomposition methodology that 
explores linkages growth patterns, and labour market performances. Through the 
decomposition analysis, growth in per capita income is explained in terms of various 
labour market components: the employment rate, hours of work, the labour force 
participation rate, productivity, quantity and returns to education. The paper applies to 
Brazil this growth and a pro-poor growth account methodology that explains how intense 
and regressive were the changes observed in labour market factors. We measure how 
each of these factors affects the growth patterns which are characterized by the growth in 
the level and in the distribution of per capita income using the Brazilian National 
Household Survey (PNAD).  The final objective is to reveal the contribution of each 
labour and non-labour component discussed above to total per capita growth and to pro-
poor growth. 
 
We focus our empirical analysis on the period of relative price stability but frequent 
external crisis from 1995 to 2004, whose results – we believe - are more structural, less 
explored in the literature and more reliable. The deflation process of nominal incomes 
during a sharp inflationary transition such as those frequently observed before 1995 is 
rather complex and uncertain, the choice of specific price indexes and associated weights 
and lags involves arbitrary decisions that affect the average level of real incomes. Since 
incomes are nominally adjusted, received and spent at different moments, inflation also 
affects inequality measures in spurious ways. In other words, it is not only causality that 
explains the coincidence between the peaks of inflation and inequality that happened in 
Brazil in 1989 and 1994 but measurement error as well.    3 
 
The period starting in 1995 misses out the labour market boom and poverty reduction 
that were both observed after the Real plan stabilization (Rocha 2003, Barros et al. 
2000). On the other hand, it captures the income inequality reduction of the 2001-2004 
period which brought Brazilian inequality to its lowest levels in the last 25 years 
(Ferreira et al. 2006, Soares 2006). After the peak of the so-called unemployment crisis 
of the second half of the nineties, there was some recovery of the labour market, 
specifically in terms of formal employment. The role played by different labour market 
variables on changes observed in the level and distribution of per capita income will be 
scrutinized.  
 
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section II is devoted to the derivation of 
pro-poor growth rate that adjusts for inequality. Section III outlines empirical aspects of 
calculating the pro-poor growth rate using household surveys. Section IV develops a 
decomposition methodology to link pro-poor growth with labour market characteristics. 
While section V describes trends in growth, inequality and poverty, section VI discusses 
economic, institutional and social fluctuations in Brazil. Sections VII and VIII present 
the empirical results for pro-poor growth rates and the decomposition method, 
respectively. Section IX concludes the study.     
 
II.  Pro-poor growth rate   
 
Suppose x is the real income of an individual, which is a random variable with density 
function f(x), then the real mean income of the population is defined as
1  
 





) ( dx x xf                                                             (1) 
 
                                                 
1 The real income is the nominal income adjusted for prices. The prices can vary across regions and over 
time. The determination of real income will depend on both regional price indices and consumer prices 
indices, which vary over time.    4 
A county’s performance in average standard of living can be measured by the growth rate 
γ  given by 
 
) (  γ Ln   =                                                            (2) 
 
Economic growth has an impact on each individual in a different manner. Following 
Kakwani and Pernia (2000), growth can be defined as pro-poor (or anti-poor) if the 
benefits of growth go to the poor proportionally more (or less) than to the non-poor. 
Thus, a pro-poor growth decreases inequality whereas an anti-poor growth increases 
inequality. The pattern of growth can be described by two factors: (i) the growth rate in 
mean income defined by γ  and (ii) how inequality changes over time. To formulate 
poverty reduction policies, it is important to look at the distributive pattern of economic 
growth and not just at the growth rate in mean income. 
 
To understand the pattern of economic growth, we have to link economic growth with 
changes in income distribution. To achieve this objective, we need to specify a social 
welfare function, which gives a greater weight to utility enjoyed by the poor compared to 
utility enjoyed by the non-poor. Suppose u(x) is the utility function, which is increasing 
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where w(x) is the weight given to the utility of the individual with income x. The main 
problem with this social welfare function is that it is not invariant to the positive linear 
transformation of the utility function. Following Atkinson’s (1970) idea of equally 
distributed equivalent level of income, we can get a money-metric social welfare 
function denoted by x
* from (3) as        
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*                                                            (4)   5 
where x
*  is the equally distributed equivalent level of income which, if given to every 
individual in the society results in the same social welfare level as the actual distribution 
of income.     
 
To make pro-poor growth operational, we need to specify u(x) and w(x). The most 
popular form of the utility function is the logarithmic utility function which, given by 
u(x) = log(x), is increasing and concave in x. In this study we adopt the logarithmic utility 
function not only because of its popularity but also because of its attractive features such 
as decomposability of growth rate in terms of some labour market characteristics. We 
will discuss this decomposition methodology in the next section.  
 
The weighting function w(x) should capture the relative deprivation that is suffered by 
the poor relative to the non-poor in society; the greater the deprivation suffered by an 
individual with income x, the greater should be w(x). Thus, w(x) should be a decreasing 
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 A simple way to capture relative deprivation is to assume that an individual’s 
deprivation depends on the number of persons who are better off than him/her in society. 
Such a weighting scheme is given by  
 
( ) 2[1 ( )] w x F x = −                                                                (6) 
  
where F(x) is the distribution function. This function implies that the relative deprivation 
suffered by an individual with income x is proportional to the proportion of individuals   6 
who are richer than this individual. It can be verified that w(x) in (6) is a decreasing 
function of x and satisfies equation (5).
2 
 
Substituting u(x) = log(x) and w(x) from (6) in (4) gives the social welfare function: 
 
0
log( *) 2 [1 ( )]log( ) ( ) x F x x f x dx
∞
= − ∫                                  (7) 
  
which provides the basis for empirical analysis presented in this paper. It will be useful 
to write (7) as  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) I log log x log
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where I is a new measure of inequality. Taking first difference in (8) gives  
 
* g γ γ = −                                                                            (10) 
   
where  ( )
* * x log   = γ  is the growth rate of money-metric social welfare x
*,   log( ) γ   =    
is the growth rate of mean income    and  log( ) g I =   is the growth rate of inequality as 
measured by I. This equation describes a growth pattern which provides the linkage 
between growth rates in the mean income and income inequality.   
 
                                                 
2 Note that this weighting scheme is also implicit in the Gini index, which is the most popular measure of 
inequality.   7 
* γ  is the proposed measure of pro-poor growth rate. If g is positive, then growth is 
accompanied by an increase in inequality. In this case, we have  γ γ <
*  and thus, there is 
a loss of growth rate due to the increase in inequality. If g is negative, this implies that 
growth is accompanied by a decrease in inequality. In this case,  γ γ >
* , which suggests 
that there is a gain in growth rate due to the decrease in inequality. Growth is defined as 
pro-poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth rate.    
 
III.  Calculating pro-poor growth rate from household surveys 
 
This study utilizes the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios (PNAD, the 
Brazilian Annual National Household Survey) from 1995 to 2004. Each household 
survey contains a variable called the weighting coefficient (WTA), which is the number 
of population households represented by each sample household. The sum of the WTAs 
for all sample households provides the total number of households in the country. A 
population weight variable (POP) can be constructed by multiplying the weighting 
coefficient (WTA) by the household size. The sum total of the (POP) variable for all 
sample households provides an estimate of the total population in the country. The total 
population estimate for Brazil was calculated as equal to 148.11 million for 1995, which 
increased to 173.71 million in 2004.  
 
Using  the  (POP)  variable,  one  can  easily  calculate  the  relative  frequency  that  is 
associated with every sample household. Suppose fjt is the relative frequency associated 
with the jth household at year t. If xjt is the per capita real income of the jth household at 
year t, then the mean income of all individuals in the country at year t can be estimated as          
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1
                                                  (11) 
 
which was estimated for every year between 1995 and 2004. We then estimate the 
growth rate of the mean income at year t as 
   8 
log( ) t t γ   =                                                            (12) 
 
To compute the social welfare function defined in (7), we need an estimate of the 
probability distribution function F(x). An unbiased estimate of F(x) for the jh household 
at year t is given by
3  
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when households are arranged in ascending order of their per capita real income  it x . 
Substituting (13) into (7) gives a consistent estimate of money-metric social welfare 
*
t x  
as given by  
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which gives an estimate of pro-poor growth rate at year t as 
 
* * log( ) t t x γ =                                                   (15) 
 
Growth will be pro-poor (anti-poor) at year t if 
*
t γ is greater (less) than t γ . 
 
IV.  Linking pro-poor growth with labour market characteristics  
 
The PNAD provides labour market characteristics of individuals. From the individual 
information, we can calculate the following variables at household level. 
 
-  Per capita real labour income ( l y ) 
                                                 
3 This equation makes a continuity correction, which is estimated by obtaining an unbiased estimate of 
F(x).   9 
-  Per capita non-labour income ( nl y ) 
-  Per capita employed persons in the household (e) 
-  Per capita labour force participation rate (l ) 
-  Per capita hours of work in the labour market (h) 
-  Per capita years of schooling in the household (s) 
 
Using these variables we calculate the following variables of interest:
4 
 
-  Employment rate:  l / e er =  
-  Hours worked per employed person:  / e h h e =  
-  Productivity:  h yl / = ξ  
 
Using these variables in the places of per capita real income in (11), (12), (14) and (15), 
we can calculate growth rates in mean values and pro-poor growth rates for each of the 
above variables. These growth rates will allow us to judge whether individuals’ labour 
market characteristics are pro-poor or anti-poor. For instance, we can answer questions 
such as: does the employment generated by the growth process favour the poor more than 
the non-poor? is the growth process increasing or decreasing the level of 
underemployment (in terms of work hours) between the poor and the non-poor? is 
growth increasing or decreasing the productivity differences between the poor and the 
non-poor?, and are the differences in labour force participation rates between the poor 
and the non-poor increasing or decreasing over time?   
 
We may provide the linkage between growth rate of per capita labour income and growth 
rates of the labour market characteristics. This linkage is provided through the following 
definition: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ξ ln ln h ln e ln y ln e r l + + + = l                                                   (16) 
 
                                                 
4 Productivity of a household is defined as labour earnings of the household’s per hour of work.    10 
Using this definition it is easy to show that growth rate in per capita labour income is 
related to labour market characteristics in an additive fashion. Thus 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ξ γ γ γ γ γ + + + = l e r l h e y               (17) 
 
This equation shows that growth in per capita labour income can be explained by four 
factors relating to labour market. Each of these factors can be either positive or negative. 
The first factor is the employment rate. If this factor is positive, this suggests that the 
employment rate has improved in the economy, contributing positively to economic 
growth. A similar interpretation can be given to the other factors. The last factor is the 
contribution of change in productivity to growth rate of per capita labour income.  
 
Again using the identity in (16) in (14), it is easy to show that the pro-poor growth rate of 
per capita labour income is also related with pro-poor growth rates of labour market 
characteristics in an additive fashion as shown in
5  
 







* h e y + + + = l                    (18) 
 
which explains the pro-poor growth rate in per capita labour income in terms of the pro-
poor growth rates of four labour market characteristics. Subtracting (17) from (18) gives 
the decomposition of the growth rate of inequality in total income in terms of four factors 
as  
 







* g g h g e g y g + + + = l                          (19) 
  
The growth rate of labour income is pro-poor (or anti-poor) if  ( ) l
* y g  is greater (or less) 
than 0.  This equation provides the contributions of various labour market characteristics 
to a gain (or loss) of growth rate due to changes in the pattern of per capita labour 
                                                 
5 Note that the pro-poorness of labour income is measured with respect to the total per capita income.   11 
income.
6 If, for instance,  ( ) r
* e g  is positive (or negative), it means that employment 
generated in the economy contributes to a decrease (or increase) in inequality in per 
capita income. A similar interpretation applies to the other factors. 
 
Schooling is a major factor that has an impact on productivity. It is generally true that the 
higher the level of schooling an individual possesses, the greater is his/her productivity 
(or labour earnings per hour). Thus, an increase in amount of schooling should lead to an 
increase in productivity. But the relationship between schooling and productivity is not 
that simple. The changes in amount of schooling are also accompanied by the changes in 
returns from schooling. The returns from schooling also vary from one household to 
another depending on hosts of factors such as age, location, occupation and so on. Also 
growth rates of returns are also not uniform across households.    
 
Productivity of the jth household denoted by 








l y  is the per capita labour income of the jth household and 
j h is the per capita 
hours of work in the labour market provided by the jth household. Suppose r  is the 
average hourly return from per year of schooling of all working population and 
j r  is the 
average return (per hour) from per year of schooling of the jth household. Then the 
productivity of the jth household can be written as  
 
( ) r / r r s




j j j s / r ξ =                                                                                         (22) 
                                                 
6 A gain in growth rate implies a decrease in inequality and a loss in growth rate indicates an increase in 
inequality.    12 
Taking logarithm in both sides of equation (21), we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r / r log r log s log log
j j j + + = ξ                                           (23) 
 
which on utilizing the averages of the variables and taking first differences gives 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) s r γ ξ γ γ = +                                                               (24) 
 
which shows that growth rate in the mean productivity can be decomposed into two 
components. The first component is the growth rate of mean years of schooling, and the 
second component is the growth rate of average returns from per year of schooling.
7 
  
Applying the identity (23) in (14), it can be easily shown that the pro-poor growth rate of 
productivity is related to three factors in an additive fashion as  
   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r / r r s
j * * * * γ γ γ ξ γ + + =                                                            (25) 
 
Subtracting (24) from (25) gives the decomposition of the growth rate of inequality in 
productivity in terms of three factors:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) r / r g r g s g g
j * * * * + + = ξ                                                      (26) 
 
The first term in (26) relates to how growth in years of schooling is distributed among 
the poor and the non-poor. The schooling will be pro-poor (or anti-poor) if g
*(s) is 
greater (or less) than zero. The second term in (26) will be always zero, because r is the 
same for all households. The third term measures the impact of redistribution of the rates 
of returns among households. If  ( ) r / r g
j *  is greater (or less) than 0, changes in the rates 
of returns from schooling favour poor (or non-poor) households more than non-poor (or 
                                                 
7 Changes in relative rates of returns from schooling do not affect the growth rate of productivity but will 
have an impact on the pro-poor growth rate of productivity through changes in the distribution.   13 
poor) households. This decomposition is useful in understanding the impact of schooling 
on growth and inequality. 
 
V.  Trends in Growth, Inequality and Poverty  
 
For this study, we have chosen per capita real income as a welfare indicator. Per capita 
real income is defined as per capita nominal income adjusted for prices, which vary 
across regions and over time. This is achieved by dividing the per capita nominal income 
by the per capita poverty line expressed as a percentage. The poverty line used in this 
paper takes into account regional costs of living (Ferreira et al. 2003).     
 
Figure 1 presents the estimates of per capita real income and money-metric social 
welfare for the period, 1995-2004. The per capita social welfare indicator shows the per 
capita income that takes inequality into account. When accounting for inequality, the per 
capita income shows a marked reduction. The sharp disparity between per capita real 
mean income and per capita social welfare reflects a high level of inequality in Brazil 
over the period.  However, the good news is that the disparity between the two indicators 
has narrowed in the recent years. This indicates a fall in inequality in Brazil over the past 
years.   
 
Figure 1: Per capita real income and social welfare 
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       Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD   14 
 
Table 1 presents growth rates of per capita real income and per capita social welfare. The 
results reveal that the trend in per capita real income has been declining at an annual rate 
of 0.63 percent over 1995-2004. Hence, the actual growth rate of per capita real income 
has been almost stagnant. This unimpressive performance in per capita real income 
worsened even further in the second period 2001-2004, when per capita real income fell 
at an annual rate of 1.35 percent.  
 
Table 1: Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  1.59  -5.95  -7.54 
1996-97  0.65  4.42  3.77 
1997-98  0.97  5.07  4.10 
1998-99  -5.15  -2.53  2.63 
1999-2001  0.76  -2.17  -2.94 
2001-2002  0.11  8.98  8.87 
2002-2003  -6.12  -9.64  -3.52 
2003-2004  3.56  14.11  10.55 
1995-2004  -0.63  0.73  1.36 
1995-2001  -0.30  0.10  0.40 
2001-2004  -1.35  3.07  4.42 
        Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Figure 2: Growth rates of per capita real income and social welfare 
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This pessimistic picture, however, tends to disappear if growth is evaluated in terms of 
social welfare adjusted for inequality, which is called the pro-poor growth rate in the 
table. This is a more relevant concept for evaluating a country’s performance in relation 
to its standard of living. In the first period (1995-2001), the trend in the pro-poor growth 
rate, although positive, was only 0.10 percent, which cannot be regarded as a good 
performance but the trend in the growth rate in the second period (2001-2004) increased 
to 3.07 percent, which is an exceptionally good performance.  
 
The last column of Table 1 is obtained by subtracting the actual growth rate from the pro-
poor growth rate. Gains in growth rates imply a decline in inequality, while losses in 
growth rates imply an increase in inequality. Substantial gains in growth rates are quite 
noticeable in the second period, 2001-2004. There have been gains in growth rates 
equivalent to 4.42 percent per annum because of falling inequality in the 2000s. By 
contrast, the gains had been merely 0.40 percent per year in the first period, 1995-2001. 
Thus, in the second period, the poor were able to benefit proportionally much more from 
growth than in the first period. This growth pattern has led to an unprecedented reduction 
in inequality in Brazil. 
 
Having examined the trends in growth and inequality, we now go on to analyze the 
trends in poverty over 1995-2004. Poverty estimates for the headcount ratio, the poverty 
gap ratio and the severity of poverty are presented in Table 2. The results show a 
significant increase in the proportion of the population crossing the poverty line between 
1995 and 1998.     
 
Table 2: Poverty estimates 
Period   Headcount ratio  Poverty gap ratio  Severity of poverty 
1995  29.37  12.80  7.69 
1996  29.23  13.31  8.26 
1997  29.24  13.00  7.98 
1998  27.83  12.28  7.40 
1999  28.81  12.58  7.53 
2001  28.28  12.75  7.84 
2002  27.39  11.78  6.95 
2003  28.19  12.32  7.51   16 
2004  26.04  10.87  6.36 
Annual growth rates 
1995-2001  -0.68  -0.54  -0.50 
2001-2004  -2.20  -4.32  -5.52 
1995-2004  -1.00  -1.46  -1.76 
    Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD   
 
The Asian crisis had a negative impact on poverty through the pressure on the currency 
and higher interest rates. For Brazil, the percentage of the poor increased from 27.83 
percent in 1998 to 28.81 percent in 1999. Since 1999, poverty had been on decline. Note 
that the real minimum wage had increased to its highest point during the period 2000-
2001, 9.1 percent. It appears that raising the minimum wage is an important measure that 
reduces poverty in Brazil as a whole. It should be highlighted, however, that the positive 
impact of a higher minimum wage rate can be reduced with a rising unemployment rate, 
due to higher costs. In Brazil, the annual growth rate of the minimum wage has been 
increasing over time and the unemployment rate has been on the rise as well. The 
unemployment rate has recently reached almost 10 percent in 2001 (WDI 2004). This 
indicates that the positive impact of the increasing minimum wage on poverty reduction 
could have been mitigated by the rising unemployment rate in the 1990s.            
 
All in all, the Brazilian experience exhibits an interesting pattern between growth in per 
capita  real  income  and  poverty:  while  per  capita  real  income  has  declined  over  the 
period, poverty has also fallen. This is an interesting case that does not support a priori 
the  notion  that  a  positive  (or  negative)  growth  leads  to  a  decrease  (or  increase)  in 
poverty. More importantly, the negative growth during the period, 1995-2004, was pro-
poor in the sense that the poor made positive gains in their incomes despite the fact that 
average incomes declined. Thus, there was a sharp decline in inequality over the period 
which offset the adverse effect of the negative growth on poverty. 
   17 
VI.  Economic, Institutional and Social Fluctuations 
 
We decided to restrict the analysis to the 1995-2004 period in order to avoid the 
imprecision associated with the deflation process during the sharp inflationary transitions 
often observed before this period. The problem is not only that the choice of a specific 
price index involves arbitrary decisions that affect the average level of real incomes. 
Fluctuations in inflation also introduce problems in the measurement of inequality firstly, 
because nominal incomes are received at different time periods. Secondly, since real 
incomes are not all spent at payments dates, it involves the incidence of inflation tax paid 
on cash holdings specifically by the poor who do not have access to indexed financial 
accounts, yet this effect is not captured in standard household surveys.  Finally, and most 
importantly, when nominal income adjustments are not synchronized, inequality of 
monthly earnings (an indicator traditionally used in Brazil) is biased upward in an 
inflationary spiral.
8 For all these reasons, we decided to start the empirical analysis after 
1994 but it is worth describing the socio-economic context at the time.  
 
After the launch of the Real Plan, inflation dropped instantaneously from about 45 
percent per month to less than 1 percent per month. The Real Plan differed from previous 
plans in at least two major ways. First, it encompassed a very successful ‘de-indexation’ 
process, which was based on the establishment of a transitory unit of account fully 
indexed to inflation. Second, it unfolded in a considerably more open economic 
environment with a somewhat overvalued currency. The Real Plan belongs to the 
‘exchange-rate based stabilization’ type of plans that led to consumption booms, instead 
of recessions. The exchange rate plays the role of an anchor on the prices of tradable 
goods. Hence, there was a change in relative prices against tradable sectors and in favour 
of non-tradable sectors – which benefited low-income workers, notably in personal and 
social services
9 but the need to support an overvalued exchange rate for stabilization 
                                                 
8 Cardoso et al. (1995)  and Ferreira et al. (2006) discuss the impacts of inflation on inequality in Brazil. 
Camargo and Neri (2001) showed using panel data that the post-stabilization fall in inequality measures on 
a monthly basis is up to 4 times higher than on a four-month mean earnings basis and the difference is 
exactly due to the reduction on the temporal variation of each individual incomes. Inflation stabilization 
brought more stability than equity.  
9 Rocha (2003) present a detailed description of the impact of the Real plan on poverty and inequality.   18 
purpose made the Brazilian economy more fragile to the waves of external shocks that hit 
the Brazilian economy such as the Mexican (1995), Asian (1997), Russian (1998) and 
Brazilian (1999) crises.  
 
Between 1996 and 1999, household per capita income from labour decreased at an 
average of 4.5 percent per annum in metropolitan areas, while remaining stable in the 
rest of the country. Unemployment rates (specifically metropolitan long-run 
unemployment) rose more than two percentage points in December 1997 after the sharp 
interest rate hike, which would be reinstated after each crisis in order to avoid capital 
outflows. Unemployment rates remained at an average annual rate of 8 percent until the 
very end of 2000 – the infamous ‘Unemployment Crisis’ (Ramos and Brito 2003). 
Although there was a decrease in average total incomes, national poverty fell; the labour 
market performed negatively between 1996 and 1999; while the social safety nets 
softened the crises’ effects (and that of the 1998 drought in the Northeast) on the poorest.  
 
The 1999 Devaluation crisis triggered important changes in the macroeconomic and 
social regimes that can be still observed today, such as: i) the adoption of floating 
exchange rates; ii) the adoption of inflation targets; iii) the implementation of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law (Lei de Responsabilidade Fiscal (LRF)) binding all government 
levels and state enterprises alike; iv) on the social front, we observe a change in social 
security income policies with progressive benefits adjustments since 1998; and v) 
expansion of targeted and conditional cash transfers such as the Bolsa-Escola among 
other programmes.   
 
In 2000, the labour market experienced a brief recovery. In this period, contrary to the 
Real plan’s initial boom, the exchange rate devaluation favoured export sectors and 
formal employment rates started to increase. In April 2001, a new crisis suddenly broke 
out, liquidating GDP growth, reportedly up to 4 percent. This crisis was a result of three 
new adverse shocks: the electrical energy rationing, the Argentinean economic collapse, 
and the American recession. In 2002, it was possible to observe a decrease in poverty   19 
rates despite the macroeconomic instability, triggered perhaps by fears of 
macroeconomic policy changes. 
 
The new administration gave a ‘confidence shock’ to the market at the beginning of 
2003, mainly keeping the three main features of the macroeconomic regime, whilst 
fighting inflation and exchange rate depreciation, resorting once again to very high real 
interest rates. The launching of the Fome Zero (Zero Hunger) programme at the 
beginning of the new administration meant an initial rupture with the cash transfer 
policies that were gradually being implemented. The net result of what may be perceived 
as a lack of adjustment in social policy, combined with the social costs of the 
macroeconomic adjustment, resulted in stagflation in 2003 and an increase in poverty.  
 
In October 2003, the government adopted a new programme called the Bolsa-Família 
(Family Grant) following the same lines as the previous administration programmes. In 
2004, the Brazilian economy presented brighter prospects, with GDP growing at 4.5 
percent and poverty falling. It is important to notice that despite the instability in GDP 
growth in the 2001-2004 period, inequality fell during this whole period and in particular 
in 2003-04. 
 
VII.  Patterns of Pro-Poor Growth 
 
In this section, our concern is with explaining the pro-poor growth in terms of factors 
relating mainly to the labour market. Per capita total income can be derived from both 
labour and non-labour income sources. To begin with, Table 3 shows growth rates of per 
capita labour income during 1995-2004. Consistent with the growth rate in per capita 
total income, earnings from the labour market have not performed well over the period. 
Per capita real labour income declined at an annual rate of 1.49 percent between 1995 
and 2004. The second period was even worse, when the growth rate in labour income 
became -2.05 percent per annum. However, the per capita growth rate in social welfare 
became positive, with an annual rate of 0.97 percent in the second period. Thus, there 
was gain of 3.02 percent in growth rate, which is attributed to a decline in inequality.   20 
This indicates that in the 2000s, the labour market conditions became better for the poor 
relative to the non-poor. Figure 4 shows that labour income had benefited the poor 
proportionally more than the non-poor in the latest period, 2003-04, in particular. It will 
be interesting to find out what factors of the labour market – such as employment and 
productivity among others – play a major role in explaining this pro-poor growth pattern 
in this period. This task is taken up in section VIII.  
 
Table 3: Growth rates of per capita labour income 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  1.16  -7.21  -8.37 
1996-97  0.33  3.71  3.38 
1997-98  -1.66  3.97  5.63 
1998-99  -6.23  -3.38  2.84 
1999-2001  0.39  -3.54  -3.93 
2001-2002  -0.58  7.24  7.82 
2002-2003  -7.15  -15.20  -8.05 
2003-2004  3.28  16.24  12.97 
1995-2004  -1.49  -0.73  0.76 
1995-2001  -1.30  -0.97  0.32 
2001-2004  -2.05  0.97  3.02 
            Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Figure 4: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita labour income 
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Next we look at the aggregate picture of non-labour income in Brazil over the period, 
1995-2004. The results emerging from non-labour income are in contrast with those from 
labour income, which we have just discussed. The story of non-labour income can be 
told with the help of Table 4. According to the table, per capita non-labour income has 
been growing at an annual rate of 2.64 percent between 1995 and 2004. Non-labour 
income had grown much faster in the first period, 1995-2001, compared to the second 
period when its growth rate has slowed down to 1.02 percent per annum. 
      
Table 4: Growth rates of per capita non-labour income 
Period  Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  3.56  0.95  -2.61 
1996-97  2.10  7.63  5.53 
1997-98  11.77  11.66  -0.11 
1998-99  -1.13  1.01  2.14 
1999-2001  2.09  3.42  1.33 
2001-2002  2.51  14.53  12.02 
2002-2003  -2.69  5.06  7.76 
2003-2004  4.48  9.18  4.71 
1995-2004  2.64  6.30  3.66 
1995-2001  3.69  5.20  1.51 
2001-2004  1.02  9.14  8.12 
            Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Figure 5: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita non-labour income 
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In view of the pro-poor growth, the non-labour income has performed even better than 
the actual growth. Interestingly, when the non-labour income is adjusted for inequality, 
the growth rate becomes much higher for the second period than for the first period. This 
is suggested by the fact that the annual pro-poor growth rates are 5.20 and 9.14 percent 
for 1995-2001 and 2001-2004, respectively. Hence, the growth in non-labour income has 
been much more pro-poor in the period of 2001-2004. More importantly, the high pro-
poorness of non-labour income is the factor that underpins the fall in inequality during 
the second period. It can be seen clearly from Figure 5 that the gap between the pro-poor 
growth rate and the actual growth rate has opened up in the second period compared to 
the first period. In sections IX and X, we examine what income components in particular 
have played a significant role in explaining the high pro-poorness of the total non-labour 
income over the period.    
 
In summary, growth in total income has been much more pro-poor in the second period 
than in the first period. This is due mainly to the non-labour income that has benefited 
the poor proportionally more than the non-poor. Compared to the non-labour income, the 
pro-poorness of the labour income has been rather small over the period. Figure 6 sums 
up these findings.     
Figure 6: Gains and losses of growth rates 
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VIII.  Linkages between labour market and pro-poor growth
10 
 
In this section, we look into the role that labour market characteristics play in 
determining pro-poor growth in Brazil. With reference to the decomposition 
methodology we proposed in the earlier section, our focus will be on factors including 
the labour force participation rate, the employment rate, hours of work per employed 
person, and productivity. These factors will be discussed in turn before we present the 
results of the decomposition methodology.  
 
VIII.1    Labour force participation   
 
The labour force participation rate is defined as the proportion of population who are 
either employed or unemployed. The labour force participation rate is then adjusted by 
the size of household to obtain per capita labour force participation rate. Thus, the per 
capita labour force participation rate will differ across households. Results shown in 
Table 5 suggest that the actual growth in per capita labour force participation rate has 
been quite slow over the decade, growing at an annual rate of just 0.73 percent. The 
situation has been much better in the second period, 2001-2004, compared to the earlier 
period.  
 
Not only did the second period perform relatively better in terms of the actual growth 
rate, but it also did much better than the first period in terms of the growth rate of the per 
capita labour force participation rate for the poor. Nevertheless, while the labour force 
participation rate overall has been anti-poor it has shown a slight improvement in the 
2000s. When the economy is not dynamic enough to absorb the labour forces in the 
market, people such as unskilled labour are likely to be discouraged from participating in 
the labour market. Yet when there is a sign of economic recovery, the labour force 
participation rate also tends to rise. This might explain the trend in the labour force 
participation rate among the poor in Brazil.  
                                                 
10 Barros and Camargo (1992) and Barros et al. (2004) develop an alternative decomposition methodology 
also applying to Brazilian data. Amadeo et al. (1993) and Amadeo and Camargo (1997) discuss the 
characteristics of Brazilian labour markets.   24 
 
In addition, Figure 7 makes an interesting point. What emerges from the figure is that the 
pro-poor growth rate for labour force participation is more volatile than the actual or 
market growth rate for the same variable. This suggests that labour force participation 
among the poor is affected more by the business cycle of the economy. When the 
economy is in recession, the labour force participation rate for the poor tends to fall 
sharply more than the national average. When the economy is in recovery, the labour 
force participation for the poor tends to rise much faster than the national average.    
         
Table 5: Growth rates of per capita labour force participation rate 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  -2.66  -4.28  -1.62 
1996-97  1.75  2.39  0.63 
1997-98  0.86  1.22  0.35 
1998-99  1.83  2.03  0.20 
1999-2001  -0.33  -1.50  -1.17 
2001-2002  2.48  2.82  0.34 
2002-2003  0.53  -1.02  -1.55 
2003-2004  1.06  2.69  1.63 
1995-2004  0.73  0.41  -0.32 
1995-2001  0.48  0.19  -0.29 
2001-2004  1.27  1.24  -0.03 
  Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD   25 
Figure 7: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita labour force participation rate 
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VIII.2    Employment 
 
The employment rate is defined as the ratio of per capita employment to per capita labour 
force participation rate.
11 As indicated by Table 6, overall employment growth has been 
negative over 1995-2004. The job growth rate of -0.66 percent per annum in the first 
period has become positive in the second period, at 0.07 percent per annum. This 
suggests that overall job growth in the labour market has been rather sluggish for the 
period, 1995-2004. As far as employment growth for the poor is concerned, it has been 
pessimistic in the entire period, anti-poor in general. However, employment among the 
poor has become pro-poor in the second period. As shown in Figure 8, employment 
growth was strongly in favour of the poor in 2001-02 and also in 2003-04 but highly 





                                                 
11 Note that this is the usual definition of the employment rate: the percentage of labour force that is 
employed.   26 
 
Table 6: Growth rates of per capita employment rate 
 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  -0.95  -1.76  -0.80 
1996-97  -0.93  -1.02  -0.09 
1997-98  -1.29  -1.38  -0.09 
1998-99  -0.74  -1.05  -0.31 
1999-2001  0.17  -0.86  -1.03 
2001-2002  0.28  1.74  1.46 
2002-2003  -0.64  -2.63  -2.00 
2003-2004  0.79  2.35  1.56 
1995-2004  -0.34  -0.68  -0.34 
1995-2001  -0.66  -1.14  -0.48 
2001-2004  0.07  0.17  0.11 
            Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Figure 8: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita employment rate 
 












VIII.3    Hours of work per employed person 
 
The hours of work per employed person refers to the ratio of hours worked per person to 
per capita employed persons in the household. Table 7 presents both actual and pro-poor 
growth rates of hours of work per employed person. The results reveal that while the 
number of weekly hours per employed person has reduced over time, it has been anti-  27 
poor in general. These findings suggest that there has been a problem with 
underemployment in the economy during the period 1995-2004. This underemployment 
problem has become more serious in the second period (2001-2004) relative to the first 
period (1995-2001). This has also happened to the poor. On the whole, while both 
employment and labour force participation rates for the poor have improved in the period 
2001-2004, the number of their working hours have declined in the same period.    
 
Table 7: Growth rates of hours of work per employed person 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  2.12  2.59  0.47 
1996-97  -1.21  -1.75  -0.54 
1997-98  -0.05  -0.07  -0.02 
1998-99  -1.51  -2.35  -0.84 
1999-2001  0.78  1.08  0.29 
2001-2002  -1.56  -1.82  -0.26 
2002-2003  -0.30  -1.50  -1.19 
2003-2004  -0.43  0.44  0.87 
1995-2004  -0.25  -0.41  -0.17 
1995-2001  -0.07  -0.21  -0.14 
2001-2004  -0.72  -1.01  -0.29 
  Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Figure 9: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of hours of work per employed person 
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VIII.4    Productivity 
 
In this study, per capita productivity is defined as per capita labour income per hour 
worked. According to Table 8, per capita productivity has been declining over time. 
Productivity deteriorated sharply in the second period in particular. However, per capita 
productivity has been pro-poor, improving from 0.18 percent per annum in the first 
period to 0.56 percent per annum in the second period. The pro-poorness of productivity 
has made a positive contribution to a reduction in inequality over the period, in particular 
the second period, 2001-04. As Figure 10 illustrates, per capita productivity was highly 
pro-poor in 2003-04.   
 
Table 8: Growth rates of per capita productivity 
Period   Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth 
1995-96  2.65  -3.77  -6.41 
1996-97  0.71  4.09  3.38 
1997-98  -1.18  4.20  5.39 
1998-99  -5.80  -2.01  3.79 
1999-2001  -0.23  -2.26  -2.02 
2001-2002  -1.78  4.50  6.28 
2002-2003  -6.74  -10.04  -3.31 
2003-2004  1.86  10.76  8.90 
1995-2004  -1.63  -0.05  1.58 
1995-2001  -1.05  0.18  1.23 
2001-2004  -2.67  0.56  3.23 
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Figure 10: Actual and pro-poor growth rates of per capita productivity 
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People acquire human capital through schooling. It is generally believed that an increase 
in human capital improves people’s earning potential. As can be seen from Table 9, that 
per capita schooling of working members within household had increased at an annual 
rate of 2.34 percent in the first period, 1995-2001. In the subsequent period (2001-2004), 
the growth rate in the years of schooling has been 4.04 percent per annum. Thus, in the 
2000s there has been a dramatic improvement in education among working population in 
Brazil. More importantly, the growth rate of social welfare calculated from the years of 
schooling has been 6.47 percent per annum during the same period. This suggests that 
the expansion of education has been pro-poor. In other words, inequality in schooling has 
been on the decline. This pro-poor expansion of education is generally expected to result 
in a higher productivity in the economy, particularly among the poor.  
 
There exists no monotonic relationship between productivity and level of schooling. If an 
expansion of schooling is accompanied by a reduction in returns from education, then 
productivity in the economy may even fall. This is exactly happening in Brazil. It is 
evident from Figure 11 that average returns from per year of schooling have been falling 
monotonically since 1996. The fall in educational returns has offset the increase in the 
average years of schooling. The fall in returns from schooling can be explained in terms 
of sluggish demand in the labour market.    30 
 
Another factor that can impact productivity is changes in relative returns from education. 
All households do not enjoy the same rates of returns for the same level of schooling. 
Changes in relative returns over time have also effects on both growth rate in the mean 
income and income inequality. The impact of changes in relative returns on growth and 
inequality is measured in the next section.   
     
Table 9: Growth rates of per capita years of schooling, working members 
Period  Actual growth rate  Pro-poor growth rate  Gain(+)/loss(-) of growth  
1995-96  1.09  -1.30  -2.38 
1996-97  2.03  2.52  0.49 
1997-98  2.26  4.49  2.24 
1998-99  2.53  4.68  2.15 
1999-2001  2.96  2.03  -0.93 
2001-2002  5.25  8.75  3.50 
2002-2003  2.81  3.96  1.16 
2003-2004  4.49  7.54  3.05 
1995-2004  2.99  3.95  0.97 
1995-2001  2.34  2.80  0.46 
2001-2004  4.04  6.47  2.43 
         Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
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Figure 11: Average Rate of Returns from per year of schooling, working members 







































VIII.6    Decomposition analysis  
 
So far, we have examined four factors in turn that have impacts on the pro-poor growth 
rate of per capita labour income. These factors are now put together by means of the new 
decomposition methodology we are proposing in this study. The decomposition results 
are presented in Tables 11-13.     
 
Table 11: Explaining growth rates of per capita real income 
Explanatory factors  1995-2004  1995-2001  2001-2004  2003-04 
Labour force participation rate  0.73  0.48  1.27  1.06 
Employment rate  -0.34  -0.66  0.07  0.79 
Hours of work per person employed  -0.25  -0.07  -0.72  -0.43 
Productivity  -1.63  -1.05  -2.67  1.86 
- Years of schooling  2.99  2.34  4.04  4.49 
- Average rate of returns per year of schooling  -4.62  -3.38  -6.71  -2.63 
- Relative rate of returns per year of schooling  -0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.00 
Total labour income  -1.49  -1.30  -2.05  3.28 
Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
The per capita labour income declined at an annual rate of 1.49 percent in the entire 
period from 1995 to 2004. The factors contributing to this decline are employment rate,   32 
hours of work and productivity. The employment rate and hours of work contributed to a 
decline in growth rate by 0.34 and 0.25 percent, respectively. The decline in productivity 
was the major factor that contributed to a decline of growth rate by 1.63 percent. Despite 
the weak labour market, the labour force participation rate increased at an annual rate of 
0.73 percent, which made a positive contribution to growth by the same magnitude. 
 
It is also evident that the work force in Brazil is getting more educated. The years of 
schooling of the labour force increased at an annual rate of 2.99 percent during the 1995-
04 period, which contributed to an increase in productivity by the same rate (2.99 
percent). The expansion of education has been accompanied by a decline in the average 
rates of return from schooling at an annual rate of 4.62 percent. This suggests that the 
demand in the labour market has been sluggish and that growth in wage rates has not 
kept up with the supply of workers with more years of schooling.  
 
A similar story emerges when we look at the sub periods: 1995-01 and 2001-04. 
However, the story changes when we look at the changes occurred during 2003-04, when 
the per capita labour income increased by 3.28 percent. Again, productivity was the 
major factor contributing to the growth, but in this case it contributed a positive rate of 
1.86 percent. The labour force participation rate increased by 1.06 percent, while the 
employment rate increased by 0.79 percent. This implies that per capita employment rate 
(i.e. the sum of the labour force participation rate and the employment rate) increased by 
1.85 percent. From these observations, we can conclude that the labour market turned 
around very strongly in the 2003-04 period. The rate of return from schooling declined at 
much slower rate of only 2.63 percent despite the fact that years of schooling of the work 
force increased at a faster rate of 4.49 percent.  
 
Table 12: Explaining pro-poor growth rate of money-metric social welfare 
Explanatory factors  1995-2004  1995-2001  2001-2004  2003-04 
Labour force participation rate  0.41  0.19  1.24  2.69 
Employment rate  -0.68  -1.14  0.17  2.35 
Hours of work per person employed  -0.41  -0.21  -1.01  0.44 
Productivity  -0.05  0.18  0.56  10.76   33 
- Years of schooling  3.95  2.80  6.47  7.54 
- Average rate of returns per year of schooling  -4.62  -3.38  -6.71  -2.63 
- Relative rate of returns per year of schooling  0.61  0.77  0.81  5.85 
Total labour income  -0.73  -0.97  0.97  16.24 
Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Table 12 presents the growth rates of money metric social welfare. The growth rate of 
per capita social welfare is -0.97 percent in the first period (1995-01) but increases to 
0.97 in the second period (2001-04). The factors that are contributing positively to 
growth in the second period are labour force participation rate, employment rate and 
productivity. The productivity growth rate of 0.56 percent is further decomposed into 
three factors: (i) years of schooling, which contributes to an increase in the growth rate of 
productivity by 6.47 percentage points; (ii) average rate of return which contributes to a 
decline in productivity by 6.71 percentage points; and (iii) relative rate of return, which 
contributes to an increase in the growth rate of productivity by 0.81 percentage points.    
 
Different households enjoy different rates of return from per year of schooling. These 
differences may be caused by a host of variables including age and gender of earners in 
household, number of earners in household, sectors of employment by workers in 
household, educational levels of working members and so on. Thus, relative rates of 
returns will also change due to a multitude of factors. The changes in relative rates of 
return will not affect the growth rate of the mean labour income but they will affect the 
social welfare, which is sensitive to changes in relative distribution. Our empirical results 
show that the changes in relative rates of return have contributed to the increase in the 
growth rate of social welfare by 0.81 percentage points. This is a small contribution 
compared to the decline in welfare that is caused by the average rate of return from 
schooling.  
 
Table 13 presents gains (and losses) of growth rates due to pro-poor (and anti-poor) 
growth. The labour income has become highly pro-poor in the 2001-04 period 
contributing to gains in the growth rate of 3.02 percent. In 2003-04, the gain in growth 
rate increased to 12.97 percent, which indicates a large reduction in inequality. Thus, the   34 
Brazilian labour market has become highly pro-poor in 2003-04. Productivity is the most 
important factor contributing to gains in the growth rate of 8.9 percent. Schooling 
contributes to gains in the growth rate of about 3 percent. The relative rates of returns 
from schooling have become highly favourable to the poor contributing to gains in the 
growth rate of 5.8 percent.     
 
Table 13: Explaining gains and losses in growth rates 
Explanatory factors  1995-2004  1995-2001  2001-2004  2003-04 
Labour force participation rate  -0.32  -0.29  -0.03  1.63 
Employment rate  -0.34  -0.48  0.11  1.56 
Hours of work per person employed  -0.17  -0.14  -0.29  0.87 
Productivity  1.58  1.23  3.23  8.90 
- Years of schooling  0.97  0.46  2.43  3.05 
- Average rate of returns per year of schooling  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
- Relative rate of returns per year of schooling  0.61  0.77  0.81  5.85 
Labour income  0.76  0.32  3.02  12.97 
Source: authors’ calculation based on PNAD 
 
Apart from productivity, the other labour market characteristics such as the labour force 
participation rate, the employment rate and work hours per employed person have also 
contributed to a large reduction in inequality during 2001-04.  
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IX.  Conclusions 
 
From the methodological point of view, the authors feel that this paper makes two 
important contributions to the literature. One contribution is its proposal for a new 
measure of pro-poor growth. This new measure provides the linkage between growth 
rates in the mean income and income inequality. In this sense, growth is defined as pro-
poor (or anti-poor) if there is a gain (or loss) in growth rate due to the decrease (or 
increase) in inequality. The other contribution is to develop a decomposition 
methodology exploring linkages between three dimensions; growth patterns, labour 
market performances, and social policies. Through this decomposition, the growth in per 
capita income is explained in terms of five components: the employment rate, hours of 
work in the labour market, the labour force participation rate, productivity , and non 
labour income. These components are all translated into per capita growth in mean 
incomes and inequality adjusted incomes. In this way the paper provides a growth and a 
pro-poor growth account exercise. 
 
For empirical analysis, the study has used the Brazilian National Household Survey 
(PNAD) from 1995 to 2004. The paper has analyzed the evolution of Brazilian social 
indicators based on per capita income exploring links with adverse labour market 
performance. The paper shows that labour earnings were the epicentre of the economic 
crisis. Although per capita income fell during the 1995-2004 period, it cannot be referred 
to as a ‘poverty crisis’. The per capita labour income declined at an annual rate of 1.49 
percent in the entire period from 1995 to 2004. The factors contributing to this decline 
are employment rate, hours of work and productivity while the labour force participation 
rate made a positive contribution to growth.  
 
The growth rate of per capita social welfare is -0.73 percent in the 1995-2004 period. The 
factors that are contributing positively to growth in the second period are labour force 
participation rate, employment rate and productivity. The productivity growth rate of 
0.56 percent is further decomposed into three factors: (i) years of schooling, which 
contributes to an increase in the growth rate of productivity by 6.47 percentage points;   36 
(ii) average rate of return which contributes to a decline in productivity by 6.71 
percentage points; and (iii) relative rate of return, which contributes to an increase in the 
growth rate of productivity by 0.81 percentage points.    
 
While labour markets were quite adversely affected, specially in the upper segments of 
Brazilian society incomes derived from government transfers played a crucial role 
cushioning the consequences of macro shocks observed, specifically among the poorest 
segments of Brazilian society. 
 
In the final year, we see light in the end of the tunnel, when pro-poor labor income rises 
by 16.24 percent. The Brazilian labour market has become highly pro-poor in 2003-04. 
Productivity is the most important factor contributing to gains in the growth rate of 10.74 
percent. Schooling contributes to gains in the growth rate of about 7.54 percent. The 
relative rates of returns from schooling have become highly favourable to the poor 
contributing to gains in the growth rate of 5.8 percent. 
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Appendix: Alternative Methodology to Decompose Productivity   
 
Schooling is a major factor that has an impact on productivity. It is generally true that the 
higher the level of schooling an individual possesses, the greater is his/her productivity 
(or labour earnings per hour). The relationship between productivity and schooling is not 
exact. There can be many unexplained factors that have an impact on productivity. A 
household consists of working and non-working members. Schooling of non-working 
members may not be relevant to explaining labour productivity in the household. Hence 
we account for per capita years of schooling of only working members within household. 
Suppose s
* is the per capita years of schooling of the working members in household. 
Using this variable, we fit the following regression model that explains productivity:   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) u log s log s log log
* * + + + =
2
2 1 β β α ξ                                                                (A1) 
 
where u is the error term which represents the aggregate impact of omitted variables from 
the model. Note that this regression equation can be estimated at household level using 
the weighted least squares method with weights being equal to population households 
represented by each sample household in the survey. Suppose  ˆ α ,  1 β ˆ  and  2 β ˆ  are the 
estimates of the model, which on substituting in (A1) gives 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) u ˆ log ˆ log log s + = ξ ξ                                                                                      (A2) 
where 




s s log ˆ s log ˆ ˆ ˆ log β β α ξ + + =  and  ( ) ( ) ( ) s ˆ log log u ˆ log ξ ξ − = . 
 
Using (A2), we can write the growth rates and the pro-poor growth rates in productivity 
in an additive fashion as  
 
ˆ ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) s u γ ξ γ ξ γ = +                                                                                                    (A3)   
and  
( ) ( ) ( ) u ˆ ˆ *
s
* * γ ξ γ ξ γ + =                                                                                           (A4)   38 
which show that growth rates in productivity can be decomposed as the sum of two 
components: the first component is the impact of schooling and the second component is 
the aggregate effect of all the unexplained factors. 
 
Subtracting (A3) from (A4) gives 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) u ˆ g ˆ g g
*
s
* * + = ξ ξ                                                                                         (A5) 
 
This equation provides the contributions of schooling and other unexplained variables to 
the growth rate of inequality in productivity. If, for instance,  ( ) s
* g ξ  is positive (or 
negative), this means that changes in schooling contribute to a decrease (or increase) in 
inequality in per capita income. Schooling can impact inequality in productivity through 
two factors. The first factor is the change in inequality of years of schooling and the 
second factor relates to returns from education. The first component in (A6) is the total 
effects of both factors. 
 
There could be various factors that have impacts on productivity. These factors might 
include years of schooling, returns to schooling, gender, experience, and so forth. In this 
study, we particularly look into years of schooling and returns to schooling. According to 
our regression analysis, the years of schooling are able to explain per capita productivity 
by almost 93-95 percent: R-square of the regression model varies between 0.93 and 0.95. 
This suggests that the years of schooling could be a prime factor that explains per capita 
productivity.   
 
Table A1 examines growth rates of years of schooling over the period with which we are 
concerned. Note that the number of years of schooling differ from one household to 
another as they are adjusted for household size. In the table per capita years of schooling 
are presented for both all members and only working members within household. From 
the results we find an overall increase in years of schooling but a higher increase for the 
poor. As a result, more years of schooling have contributed to a fall in inequality of years 
of schooling over the period, which is sharper in the second period, 2001-04. The pro-  39 
poorness of schooling is far greater in the second period compared to the first period. In 
addition, the results highlight that the degree of pro-poorness of schooling of working 
members is higher than that of all members within household.      
 
 
Table A1: Growth rates of per capita years of schooling 













of growth  
1995-96  5.28  7.97  2.68  1.09  -1.30  -2.38 
1996-97  1.73  1.53  -0.20  2.03  2.52  0.49 
1997-98  3.80  5.15  1.35  2.26  4.49  2.24 
1998-99  2.93  5.57  2.63  2.53  4.68  2.15 
1999-2001  2.55  3.67  1.12  2.96  2.03  -0.93 
2001-2002  3.71  5.48  1.77  5.25  8.75  3.50 
2002-2003  3.24  8.13  4.89  2.81  3.96  1.16 
2003-2004  2.54  0.65  -1.89  4.49  7.54  3.05 
1995-2004  3.05  4.66  1.61  2.99  3.95  0.97 
1995-2001  3.05  4.46  1.41  2.34  2.80  0.46 
2001-2004  3.17  5.09  1.92  4.04  6.47  2.43 
     Source: authors’ calculation 
 
The impact of schooling on changes in inequality can be explained by two factors. One is 
changes in inequality of years of schooling and the other is changes in returns from 
schooling. As we have observed earlier, schooling has become more equal across the 
population in Brazil. This in turn has contributed to a reduction in inequality: the higher 
level of education, the greater earnings per hour. However, rates of return from education 
also change over time. In this context, we look at the returns to each year of schooling in 
Brazil over 1995-2004. Figure A2 presents the trends in the returns from schooling over 
two periods, 1995-2001 and 2001-2004. The results show that educational returns have 
declined at all levels. It is evident that across educational levels, the curve of returns has 
an upward sloping in the first period but a downward sloping in the second period. This 
suggests that the gap in educational returns widened in the first period but narrowed in 
the second period. While the widening gap indicates an increasing inequality, the 
narrowing gap implies a fall in inequality. Therefore, a sharp decline in inequality over   40 
the 2001-04 period is mainly due to the gap in educational returns that has narrowed over 
the period between higher and lower levels.    
 
 
Figure A1: Returns from schooling 
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